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All things being equal, practitioners would
always recommend conservative, rather than ag-
gressive, tax planning strategies. But, of course,
all things are seldom equal. Many factors in
addition to the certainty of one's position must
be considered, and after such consideration ag-
gressive approaches sometimes look pretty good.
Prior to enactment of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA"),
taxpayers and tax practitioners clearly had a
considerable amount of leeway in planning ag-
gressively without risk of penalties. All that
was required to avoid taxpayer negligence pen-
alties and preparer penalties was a "good faith
reasonable argument." TEFRA discourages ag-
gressive tax planning 'by introducing new pen-
alty provisions that sometimes hold the taxpayer
and perhaps tax practitioners, to a higher stand-
ard. This article will arbitrarily define aggressive
tax planning and analyze its attractiveness to
clients. The pre-TEFRA penalty provisions will
be detailed, followed by a close look at the new
provisions. Finally, an attempt will be made to
predict the future of aggressive tax planning in
light of the old and new penalty provisions.
In a perfect world there would be a definite
answer to every question. A particular tax strat-
egy would either work or not work; it would be
that simple. Needless to say, our world is not
perfect and practitioners are often uncertain as to
the proper outcome of any given tax strategy.
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The White, Black and Gray Areas
When a taxpayer has at least a reasonable
argument for a particular result and the IRS does
not have at least a reasonable argument for a
different result, we might describe that tax-
payer's position as being in the white area of the
law. (See Exhibit I at page 58.) Any tax
strategy in the white area is conservative. If
the IRS attacks a conservative strategy, it will
(by definition) lose in court and, as a penalty,
pay the taxpayer's attorney's fees."
When the IRS has at least a reasonable ar-
gument for a particular result and the taxpayer
does not have at least a reasonable argument for
a different result, we might describe any position
other than the IRS position as being in the
black area. Numerous penalty provisions, crim-
inal as well as civil, are at least potentially ap-
plicable when the taxpayer is in the black.2 Any
tax strategy in the black area is inappropriate.
Under no circumstances should a practitioner
knowingly allow a client to take a position in
the black area.
In between the white and the black is a fairly
broad area that we call 'the gray area. A position
is in the gray area when both the taxpayer and
the IRS have, at a minimum, a reasonable argu-
ment for their respective positions. Structuring
and/or reporting a situation based upon a gray
area position constitutes aggressive planning.
Perhaps it will work; perhaps it will not work.
It is common knowledge that greater amounts
of taxes can (potentially) be saved, or the same
amount of taxes can be saved at less sacrifice, as
the taxpayer moves from the white area toward the
black area. The black his always been off limits
but the gray area has not. Perhaps that is chang-
ing. Before addressing a possible change in this
regard, however, it is necessary to acknowledge
the main reason so much aggressive planning
has been recommended over the years by ex-
perienced practitioners. After all, why be greedy
when at least some taxes can usuilly be saved
through utilization of conservative strategies?
The answer is easy. As a practical matter,
taxpayers who have taken position in the gray
area have generally won by default. This fact
is so important to the thrust of this article that
it deserves being repeated. Only a minority of the
time does an aggressive position even come to
the attention of the IRS. Most of the time, ag-
gressive tax planning works by default.
This "virtue" of aggressive planning 'is not
a heavily guarded secret. Any seasoned tax prac-
titioner is aware of it. Former, IRS Commissioner
Jerome Kurtz said as much when addressing the
ABA Section of Taxation in May of 1978 about
the "unfair" nature of aggressive tax planning.
He complained that the system worked against
the IRS when taxpayers plan aggressively: "There
is a good chance that they will prevail because
the return will not be examined, or if the return
is examined the item won't be found. , . ." He
later described the aggressive taxpayer's chance
for victory by default as a "substantial likeli-
hood." I
To simply say that aggressive tax planning
will probably work does not in and of itself make
it as attractive as conservative planning. After
all, conservative planning will definitely work.
The real advantage of gray area planning over
conservative planning is that it offers either
greater tax savings or the same tax savings at
less sacrifice.
Specific Situations.-To illustrate, let's con-
sider a specific situation. Joe Client stops by our
office to inform us that he just read a magazine
article extolling the advan'tqges of shifting income
from the highest tax bracket of. a parent to"the
low brackets of his minor children. He asks us
how he can dp this. We begin by explaining that
a gift of an income-producing asset will serve
to shift all bsequently generated income to the
donee. But he quickly vetoes' that approach by
emphasizing that he' wants to give up only in-
come, not income-producing assets. Undaunted.,
we suggest a short-term -trust which will enable
him to shift income' while retaining the right to
recover his income-producing asset in 10 years
or so. He responds that he does not want to.tie
up his assets for 10 years, he wants more flexi-
bility. Of course there are a few other strategies
we might suggest,4 but let's assume we conclude
that all the conservative shifting strategies in-
volve more sacrifice than this guy is willing to
'A taxpayer who prevails in civil tax litigation in
any federal court (including the Tax Court) may be
awarded reasonable 'rttorney's fees and other litigation
costs if he establishes that the government's position
was unreasonable. Note, however, the maximum award
is only $25,000 and this provision applies only to civil
tax litigation begun between March 1, 1983, and Decem-
ber 31, 1985. Section 7430.
2 Straiegies that fall within the black area are beyond
aggressve. given the definition of aggressive provided
herein. 15ractitipners who allow, clients' to venture into
the black (e.'.l establish family trusts) are either
ignorant of the law or unethical or both.
'"Discsib"i of Questionable Positions," 32 Tax
Lawyer 13, 15 (1979).
See" Roth, "Ten Ways to Shift Income to Minor
Children'!, CCH Estate Planning Review, Special Report,
(1982) 35-39.
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maake. Now that we know there is no conserva-
tive strategy that appeals to this client, we step
into the gray and introduce the client to a variety
of aggressive tax planning stiategies. For ex-
ample, we describe how a trust can be estab-
lished for the benefit of the client's children,
minimally funded, and then lent a significant
amount of money, interest free. The trustee can
use the borrowed money to generate income that
will arguably be taxed to the trust or its bene-
ficiaries, not the settlor/lender who made if all
possible. We explhin that this strategy eliminates
the need to make a substantial gift of anything
but income. Furthermore, the client now has
the ability to get his cash 'back at any time, for
any reason; simply by calling the note due.,
Of course, there are other aggressive possi-
bilities,6 but let's assume that this particular
client likes this income-shifting strategy and im-
mediately sdys "let's do it." It is at this point
that the practitioner must very carefully explain
that while he has a reasonable argument that the
interest-iree loan will have the effect of shifting
income from the lender to the borrower, the IRS
has (or may think it has) a reasonable argument
for i different result. Ifi other words, this strat-
egy is in the gray area and therefore the ultimate
result cannot be. predicated with any certainty.
Once the clieht understands that this is not
a conservative planning tool, the next step is to
help the client analyze the potential ramifications
of being in the gray area in this particular situa-
tion. First of all; we need to at least attempt to
determine whether we are in the light gray, the
mid gray or the dark gray. In other words, do we
think that our argument is better than that of the
IRS (the light gray area), do we think the IRS's
position is the better of the two arguments (the
dark gray area) or do we think it is a toss-up as
to which position is correct (the mid gray area).
We would rather be in the light gray than the
dark gray, but either way we stand a good chance
of winning by default.
It should be noted that being in the light gray
does not assure victory if the issues comes up on
audit. If the agent thinks the IRS's position is
reasonable, he may refuse to accept the taxpayer's
position.' While the controversy can (and prob-
ably should) be pursued further, at least within
the IRS if not in court, that can be expensive.
It is not uncommon that gray area issues raised
on audit are at least partially conceded by the
client because he cannot afford to fight, if for
no other reason. This can be hard for the client
to swallow when he and his advisor are convinced
the issue is in the light gray (i. e., they have the
better argurient).
If the practitioner feels sure -his client's posi-
tion is somewhere within the gray area, he should
not have to worry about the imposition of a
Section 665 3(a) (or any other pre-TEFRA penalty
provision) penalty against the client or a Section
6694 preparer's penalty. The reason is simple.
The standtird used to determiie whether a Sec-
tion 6653 or a Section 6694 penalty should be
asse-ted is whether the position in question is a
"good faith reasonable positiohi." '' The same
standard is used in establishing the ethical limits
for lawyers and CPAs.9 By definition, a position
is o'nly in the gray area if the taxpayer has at
least a reasonable argument. Therefore, these,
pre-TEFRA penalty priovisions theoretlically should
not affect ethical practitioners hd their clients.
.Presumably, "good faith" only means the
party really believes his position is reasonable.
Disclosure bf a gray area issue is not essential to
avoid Section 6653 and Section 6694 pehalties,
but it nlay be an indication that the reasonable
position was held in "good faith."
The pioblem with this theory is that reason-
able people sometimes differ as to what is a
reasonable position. An agent may argue that
the taxpayer'§ position is not only incorrect, it
'See Roth, "Can lender be charged with receiving
taxable income as a result of an interest-free loan?," 52
Journal of Taxation 136 (March 1980).
' See note 4, supra.
'While its source could hardly 8e described as
highly authoritative, I feel tompelled to share the follow-
ing quote:
Firlst of all, [the agent] is taught tax law, but only
is the IRS sees it. There is little theory here, no
gray areas, no Harvard Law School pacing back
and fbrth, with "on the one and ... on the other
hand".... [The agent's] training makes the tax
law simple. If it's incbme, tax it. When in doubt,
tax it. If there are questionable deductions and
credits, turn them down.
Strassels and Wool,, "All You Need, To Know About
the IRS," Random House, New Yoi'k, 1980, at 156-57.
'Reg. §§ 1.6653-1 and 1.6694-1(a)(4).
'Rule 102 of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics
states, "In tax practlce, a member may resolve doubt in
favor of his client as long as there ig reasonable support
for his kosition."; Opinion 314 of the ABA Committee
on Professional Ethics states, "... a lawyer who is
asked to advise his client in the course of the preparation
of the client's ta) returns may fr6ely, urge the statement
of pogitions most favorable to the client just as long as
there is reasonable basis for. those positions. Thus where
the lawyer believes there is a reasonable basis for a
positibn that a particular transaction does not result in
taxable iicoine, or that certain expenditures are properly
deductible as expenses, the lawyer has no duty to advige
that ridbtes be attached to the client's tax return explain-
ing the circumstances surrounding the transaction or
the expenditures."
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is unreasonable. Does this ever happen? Con-
sider another quote from former Commissioner
Kurtz, this one regarding assertion of preparer
negligence penalties by agents:
Our statistics indicate that a significant number
of cases that go to appeals are reversed,
which indicates that either there is a lack of
understanding of the rules by appeals offi-
cers or penalties are being asserted where
they shpuld not be.10
A practitioner who feels a position is in the
light gray area will probably not worry too much
about the possibility of a negligence or other
penalty being slapped on him or his client. Simi-
larly, a position in the mid gray is generally not
too worrisome. But a position the practitioner
thinks is in the dark gray will require at least
some concer about the possibility of a negli-
gence penalty being asserted.
To illustrate, a properly dociumented interest-
free loan to the independent trustee of a chil-
dren's trust is an income-shifting strategy that
falls in the light gray area. Consequently, the
worst that can happen is that it will not Work.
Income that would have been taxed to the parent
if he had done nothing will end up being taxed
to him. He will pay interest on the deficiency,
but that will be computed at approximately the
prime lending rate. This can hardly be con-
sidered a significant downside risk since the
taxpayer had the use of the tax dollars for an
extended period of time. Most clients would love
to borrow regularly from the government, or
anyone else, at the prime rate.
While the possibility of incurring interest
costs is not a significant deterrent to aggressive
planning, the possibility of a nondeductible pen-
alty can lurk as a meaningful deterrent. But
with this last strategy which is characterized as
being in the light gray area, negligence penalties
would not be seen as a significant threat.
Let's change the facts a bit. Joe Client wants
to cut a few corners in shifting income. Iie
wants less costs and does not want to give up
use of his money for any significant period of
time. Specifically, he wants to make the interest-
free loan directly to his minor children and then
have his wife borrow that money from the minor
children at a 20% rate of interest. Assuming
(1) the children make no express or implied
agreement to lend the money to their mother
prior to borrowing it from their father, (2) the
minors are reasonably mature, and (3) the wifei
is not acting as a mere agent of her husband
when she borrows the money from the children,
this variation would be in the gray area and
therefore something the client can try." But it is
(at best) in the dark gray and many agents would
view it as being in the black. Consequently, neg-
ligence and other pre-TEFRA penaltip§ are a real
possibility. The downside risk is that it may not
work and penalties may be imposed. Disclosure
on the return can lessen the possibility of a pen-
alty, but even that is no guarantee. And, of
course, few clients like to make special disclosure
of questionable positions because it arguably in-
creases the chance of an audit.1 2
Summary of Downsi~le Risk
If a strategy is such that its failure to work
results in the same tax liability that would have
resulted if it had not been attempted, one could
argue that the only downside risk is the possi-
bility of a penalty. Interest at prime is a reason-
able cost of delaying the payment of taxes.
Of course, one cannot forget that the cost
qf implementation and administration of a tax
strategy is not recouped just because the strategy
fails. Also, there is the possibility of an oppor-
tunity cost. That is, the alternative to the aggres-
sive approach might have been a: less desirable
conservative approach that would -have saved
some taxes.
TEFRA Penalty Provisions
Based upon the discussion thus far, aggres-
sive tax planning can be quite attractive. Save
more and/or sacrifice less and probably win by
default, if not on the merits of the argument.
Keep an eye on possible penalties, but reco,.ize
that all one needs to avoid these is a good'falth
reasonable argument, which is arguably a low
standard. Aggressive tax planning certainly can
be very attractive.
That's the problem. It has worked too well,
at least in the eyes of Congress. In an attempt
to reduce the current attractiveness of aggressive
tax planning, Congress has es tablished two new
penalty provisions, Section 6661, entitled "Sub-
stantial Underpayment of Liability" and Section
" 11 Tax Advisor 425 (July, 1980).
"Two significant differences between this fact pattern
and the one in Revenue Ruling '82-94, 1.982-20 IRB 5,
is that here the second borrower is someohie other than
the first lender and there is no prearraAged understand-
ing that the second loan will be made.
" In polling many CPAs about their experience with
special disclosure, the author has discovered that the vast
majority have indicated that special disclosure on a
return' has not seemed to increase the chance of audit.
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6701, entitled "Penalties for Aiding and Abetting
Understatement of Tax Liability." There are
other penalty provisions in TEFRA, but they are
aimed solely at black area strategies, not gray
area strategies. For example, Section 6700 im-
poses a penalty on persons promoting abusive
tax shelters. The specifics of this provision make
it clear that it only applies where unreasonable
and/or deceitful positions are involved.
Section 6661: "Substantial Under-
payment of Liability"
The Statement of tie Managers accompanying
TEFRA makes it clear that while the members of
the Congressional conference committee wanted
to reduce the attractiveness of zaggressive tax
planning, they did not want to penalize a tax-
payer just because his tax position might not
reflect the "correct treatment." They decided to
discourage positions supported by a "mere rea-
sonable basis." Interestingly, the Statement of
the Managers confrms the generally held belief
that a reasonable f asis is fiti *a terribly high
standard, "a 'reasonable basis' bein one that is
arguable, but fairly unlikely to prevail in cotit
upon a complete review of the facts and author-
ities." 18
The new standard which must generally be
met to avoid a penalty under Section 6661 is
"substantial authority." That is, a position (other
than. one involving a tax helter) will not result
in a .penalty if there was substantial authority for
the taxpayer's treatrfient' Congress used this
new terminology in an attempt to give the courts
flexibility in applying the provision. The only
specific guidance given by the Statement of Man-
agers is the following range: "The conferees
believe such a 4tandard should be less stringent
than a 'more likely than not' standard and more
stingent than a 'reasonable basis' standard." 15
Arguably this means that Section 6661 applies only
to positions in what this article has labelled as dark
gray. The IRS has the flexibility to use the old "good
faith reasonable argument" standard in applying
Section 6661, but one -has to wonder when it Will
do so except in exchange, for some taxpayer con-
cession.' 6 (See Exhibit II at page 58 for a repre-
Sentation of the likelihood of a taxpayer using
any of these three standards successfully.)
Another way to escape the reach of Section
6661 (on matters other than tax shelters) is to
disclose all the relevant facts affecting the item's
tax treatment in the return or in a statement at-
tached to the return." As commented earlier,
disclosure may be a paper tiger.18 If so, it pro-
vides a relatively painless way to completely
sidestep the TEFRA shadow.
Special Rule for Tax Shelters
"Substantial authority" and/or disclosure
will not serve to avoid Section 6661 when a "tax
shelter" is involved. A "tax shelter" is defined
broadly as "a partnership or other entity, any
investment plan or arrangement, or any plan
or arrangement, if the principal purpose of such
partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the
avoidance or evasion of teFedei-a income tax." '9
This could arguably encompass just about every-
thing that falls under the heading of aggressive
tax planning.
If a "tax shelter" is involved, disclosure does
not -prevent application of Section 6661. To avoid
Section 6661;ithe taxpayer must show that he
reasonably believed that his tax treatment was
more likel than not the proper treatment. In
other words5 if the taxpayer's position regarding
a tax shelter is beyond the light gray, he is run-
ning the risk of a Section 6661 penalty notwith-
standing the fact that he makes full disclosure
and has a reasonable position or even substantial
authority for his position.
The Penalty
The Section 6661 penalty is 10% of any "sub-
stantial understatement of tax." For this pur-
pose, an understatement is the excess of the
amount of income tax imposed on the taxpayer
for the taxable year over the amount of tax shown
on the return. The understatement is "substan-
tial" only if it exceeds the greater of 10% of the
tax required to be shown on the return for the
taxable year or $5,000 ($10,000 in the case of
corporations other than Subchapter S corpora-
tions and personal holding companies). This
definition of "substantial" makes Section 6661
totally inapplicable in many situations.
Example: Joe Client in the previous ex-
ample files a tax return for 1983 reporting an
amount of taxable income which does not
include $10,000 of income he shifted to his
" Statement of the managers, Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Bill of 1982, as published by Commerce
Clearing House, August 19, 1982, at 575.
'* Section 6661 (b) (2) (B) (i).
See note 13, supra.
"Section 6661(c).
"Section 6661 (b) (2) (B) (ii).
"See note 12, supra.
"Section 6661(b) (2)(C) (ii).
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minor children through use of an interest-
free loan. Assuming the worst: (1) he is
audited, (2) the issue of the effectiveness of
an interest-free loan as an income shifting
device comes up, and (3) the issue is resolved
against Joe Client, his "understatement of
tax liability" will amount to $5,000 or less.
Consequently, Section 6661 is inapplicable.
As was the case with pre-TEFRA penalty
provisions, taxpayers will probably escape penal-
ties upon a showing they relied upon the advice
of a competent tax advisor that their position
was justifiable under the law.
Section 6701: "Penalties for
Aiding and Abetting Understate-
ment of Tax Liabilities"
In theory, this new provision is no problem
for the honest practitioner who stays out of the
black. It only applies to persons who (1) aid or
assist in, procure, or advise with respect to, the
preparation or presentation of any portion of a
return, affidavit, claim, or other document in
connection with any matter arising under the tax
laws, (2) who know that such portion will be
used in connection with any material matter
arising under the tax laws, and (3) who know that
such portion (if so used) will result in an under-
statement of the liability for tax of another person.
It is the italicized ingredient that will be missing
when the practitioner is doing his job properly.
To take a position that practitioner knows will
result in an understatement of taxes is beyond
aggressive planning. He is in the black area.
The Section 6701 penalty is $1,000 for each
return or other document ($10,000 when it relates
to the tax liability of any corporation). The IRS
must choose between this penalty and the Section
6694 preparer penalties. It cannot assert both in
the same situation.
Again, in theory this provision should not
affect the ethical practitioner. But in reality it
might be problematic. Some agents may use
Section 6701 whenever they come across a very
aggressive position, one in the dark gray. Their
logic would be that the practitioner knew his
argument was not a winning argument and there-
fore knew an adjustment would be made if the
issue came up on audit. Thus, he knew there was
an understatement; he just hoped it would not
be picked up on audit.
The amount of Section 6701 penalty is the
same whether the underpayment is "substantial"
or minimal. And the fact disclosure might have
been made does not directly affect imposition of
this penalty. The penalty can be asserted even
when the client escapes a Section 6661 penalty
for some reason.
Where to Go from Here
Ignoring for the moment the TEFRA penalty
provisions, aggressive tax planning in general
is just as attractive as ever. It is often fairly
easy to design a strategy that seems almost too
good to be true, that is safe from pre-TEFRA
penalties because of the relatively low standard
of a mere "good faith reasonable position."
But TEFRA has changed the ground rules.
Beginning in 1983, the taxpayer and the tax
advisor have new and potentially burdensome
penalty provisions hanging overhead. Their effect
must be determined on a situation-by-situation basis.
For example, when the possible underpayment is
$5,000 or less, the TEFRA position potentially
affecting taxpayers (Section 6661) will be in-
applicable.
Generally speaking, the TEFRA provisions
will probably serve to reduce significantly the
amount of very agressive tax planning (dark gray
positions), reduce somewhat the amount of middle
aggressive tax planning (mid gray positions), but
leave untouched most mildly aggressive strategies
(light gray positions). Furthermore, unlike the
Section 6653 preparer penalties, the TEFRA pro-
visions will probably increase significantly the
number of times disclosure of a questionable
position is made. 0
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Exhibit I
Estimated I% Chance of a Taxpayer's Position Being Upheld in Court
100%
White
Conservative
Greater Savings and/or Less Sacrifice -
Exhibit II
Estimated % Chance That a Taxpayer's Position Will Be Upheld by a Court of
Law; Location of Various Standards Used in Applying Penalties
Standard
100%
90%
80%
70%
"more likely than not 60%
the correct treatment" 
-51%- 50%
40%
"based on substantial 
-35%- 30%
authority" 
-20%- 20%
"reasonable argument" 10%
0%
Suggested Ranges for Following Designations:
"more likely than not the correct treatment": 51%-100%.
"based on substantial authority": 35%-100%.
"reasonable argument": 20%-100%.
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